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A TEST OF FOUR THEORIES  OF POWER IN EXCHANGE  NETWORKS* 
JOHN  SKVORETZ  DAVID  WILLER 
University  of South Carolina  University  of South Carolina 
We evaluate four  theories that predict the distribution of power in exchange networks. 
All four theories-core  theory, equidependence theory, exchange-resistance theory, and 
expected value theory-assume  actors rationally pursue self-interests. Three of the theo- 
ries add social psychological  assumptions that place  the pursuit of self interest in an 
interactive context. Predictions of exchange earnings by the four theories are evaluated 
against data from eight experimental networks, including types of networks not previ- 
ously studied. These networks vary conditions that affect the chances that a position can 
be excluded from exchange.  We  find  that when the theories base predictions on a net- 
work position's structural potential for  exclusion, exchange-resistance theory provides 
the bestfit,  but when predictions are based on actual experiences of exclusion, expected 
value theory fits  best. Our discussion focuses  on the distinction between the a priori 
potential for exclusion versus experienced exclusion as factors  in the genesis of power 
T he problem of power distribution  in ex- 
change networks has captured  the atten- 
tion of a variety  of theorists.  The appeal  of the 
problem derives from the combination  of the 
formal  representation  of social structure  as net- 
work (Wellman and Berkowitz  1992)  and 
sociology's perennial concern with power. A 
growing  body of experimental  studies  now per- 
mits researchers  to test various  theoretical  for- 
mulations. How does location in a network 
confer advantages  on a person or a corporate 
body in their dealings with others? Consider 
the promotion  prospects  of two senior accoun- 
tants,  Andy and  Bob. Because Andy's work in- 
volves accounts  at various  regional  offices, his 
coworkers typically do not know each other. 
Bob, on the other hand, deals with corporate 
accounts, so his coworkers  typically associate 
with each other.  Thus, Andy and Bob are sur- 
rounded  by two very different  networks  and it 
is not obvious that  Andy's network  favors him 
for promotion (Burt 1992). In a second ex- 
ample, a university  department  searches for a 
chairperson  who can negotiate  with the college 
dean for support  for the department.  The com- 
mon intuition  that  outsiders  are more desirable 
is grounded  in a belief that outsiders' network 
ties provide alternatives that insiders cannot 
match. These ties  strengthen the outsider's 
hand,  giving an outsider  more  power to negoti- 
ate favorable  levels of support. 
The strategic  considerations  quickly expand 
as alternatives  distant in the network impact 
on the bargaining  power of the dean and the 
leading candidate.  Such considerations  lead to 
the problem of  power distribution as it has 
been addressed in the network exchange lit- 
erature.  This literature  investigates  the general 
properties  of networks  that influence the allo- 
cation of valued resources  and focuses on how 
alternative  positions remote in the network  af- 
fect earnings  from exchange in the network's 
ties. 
We use experiments  to evaluate four recent 
theories that predict power distribution/re- 
source allocation in exchange networks. The 
four theories are game-theoretic  core analysis 
(Bienenstock  and  Bonacich 1992), the equide- 
pendence  principle  (Cook  and Yamagishi 
1992), the expected value model  (Friedkin 
1992, forthcoming), and network exchange- 
resistance  theory (Markovsky, Willer,  and 
Patton 1988; Willer, Markovsky, and Patton 
1989; Markovsky,  Skvoretz,  Willer, Lovaglia, 
and Erger 1993). 
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The key question is which of the four theo- 
ries best predicts  observed  power distributions. 
This evaluation  of the theories'  relative  predic- 
tive powers contributes  to a long-standing  pro- 
cess of theory  competition  in this research  field 
that is necessary to a field's development  into 
a theoretic science (Wagner  and Berger 1985; 
Lakatos 1970). We are also concerned  with the 
theories' absolute  predictive  power:  How well 
does the best fitting theory account for ob- 
served power distributions  and how could its 
fit be improved? Our investigation uncovers 
new  understandings  about exclusion  as  a 
source of power in networks. 
Our evaluation of the four theories is com- 
prehensive-we  examine resource distribu- 
tions in eight different networks. These net- 
works vary along three  dimensions:  (1) shape, 
as defined  by the connections  among  positions; 
(2) number  of exchanges available  to each po- 
sition; and (3) number  of exchanges per con- 
nection. All previous studies have varied the 
first dimension; three studies have varied the 
second dimension (Brennan  1981; Markovsky 
et al.  1988; Skvoretz and Willer 1991); and 
none has varied  the third.  Varying  the three  di- 
mensions allows us to extend  the scope of each 
theory. 
This extension of scope is valuable for two 
reasons. First, the applicability  of theories to 
networks outside the laboratory  is improved. 
Individuals  are seldom limited  to one exchange 
per partner,  as most previous  experiments  have 
assumed. Furthermore,  an experimental net- 
work that allows multiple exchanges per con- 
nection more closely resembles naturally  oc- 
curring  exchange structures.1  Investigation  of 
these experimental networks shows how to 
modify the principles developed for simple 
structures  to apply  to the more  complicated  cir- 
cumstances found in natural  settings. Second, 
the extension of scope allows us to examine 
further the fundamental distinction between 
''strong power" and "weak power" networks 
that has recently emerged in the literature 
(Markovsky  et al. 1993). 
Power differences  are measured  by differen- 
tial earnings per exchange.2 In strong power 
networks,  earnings  favor the advantaged  posi- 
tion to an extreme  degree:  The advantaged  po- 
sition appropriates  about  90 percent  or more of 
the available resources, leaving 10 percent or 
less to the disadvantaged position. In weak 
power networks,  earnings  per exchange favor 
the advantaged  position to a moderate  degree: 
The advantaged  position typically appropriates 
60 to 75 percent of available resources. Why 
do networks  differ  so strikingly  in the distribu- 
tion of power? 
Current  thinking suggests that the critical 
factor is the potential  for exclusion associated 
with a particular  position in a network struc- 
ture,  i.e., the ways in which exchanges  by some 
positions can preclude  exchanges by other  po- 
sitions. For instance, if each position can ex- 
change only once, the A-B-A  network is  a 
strong power network-B  is never excluded 
but one A is always left out. If each A offers 
increasingly  better  exchanges  to B to avoid ex- 
clusion, extreme  differences  in resource  distri- 
bution  result.  On the other  hand,  the four posi- 
tion A-B-B-A  network  is a weak power net- 
work-the  Bs are never excluded, but exclu- 
sion of one or both of the As is not inevitable. 
Each B has only another  B as an alternative  to 
its A and so each A needs only to better the 
other B's offer to avoid exclusion. In this net- 
work, moderate  resource  differentiation  is ex- 
pected. 
The four theories agree, at least implicitly, 
that exclusion determines power. However, 
their predictions differ because each theory 
makes different  assumptions  about the effects 
of exclusion. Underlying these differences is 
the question  of whether  exchange  outcomes  are 
determined  by the a priori  potential  for exclu- 
sion  or  the  actual  experience  of  being  ex- 
1 Real networks-and  the exercise of power in 
them-still  differ in many ways from these experi- 
mental structures.  In our view, extension of scope 
must continue in a stepwise fashion guided by a 
body of theoretical issues  -and concerns as formu- 
lated in ongoing research  programs.  In that  context, 
permitting multiple exchanges per connection is a 
theoretically  justified manipulation  of a central  ini- 
tial condition of the research programs  we evalu- 
ate. 
2 We do not evaluate predictions  about the rela- 
tive frequency  of exchanges between particular  po- 
sitions for three  reasons. First, some of the theories 
do not make such predictions. Second, some pre- 
dictions of frequency of exchange are imprecise, 
e.g., "few"  exchanges are anticipated  (Bienenstock 
and Bonacich 1993). Third, precise predictions  of- 
ten are a priori assumptions  of structural  potential 
that  are  not necessarily  intended  to predict  observed 
frequencies  of exchange (Markovsky  1992; also see 
Lovaglia and Skvoretz 1993). EXCLUSION  AND POWER  803 
eluded.  We address  this question  and  thus  carry 
the investigation  of network  exchange  one step 
further  than  previous studies. 
FOUR THEORIES  OF POWER  IN 
EXCHANGE  NETWORKS 
The concept of power has a precise  meaning  in 
the literature  on exchange networks.  Exchange 
usually is an agreement  between two actors  on 
the division of a pool of resources  or "profit" 
points.3  Power is indicated  by a division of re- 
sources that  significantly  favors one actor  over 
another:  The actor  with the larger  share  is said 
to be exercising power over the actor with the 
smaller share (cf. Cook and Emerson 1978; 
Willer 1992). The interpretation  that power is 
being exercised is consistent  with the idea that 
actors rationally pursue self-interests  and, 
therefore, would not voluntarily agree to a 
small share  if a larger  share  were possible. 
The four theories share  one fundamental  as- 
sumption:  Power differentials  between actors 
are related  to differences  in actors'  positions in 
the network  of exchange relations.  That is, the 
determinants of power, as revealed through 
"exchange outcomes of power use" (Molm 
1990), are actors' structural  locations rather 
than their strategic  actions.4  The key theoreti- 
cal  problem is  identifying  the structurally 
advantaged  positions in a network,  i.e., the po- 
sitions that will exercise greater  power in ex- 
change relations. 
Proposals  range  from simple measures  (e.g., 
positions  connected  to many  other  positions  are 
more advantaged  than those connected to few 
other positions) to more complicated graph- 
theoretic attributes  like "vulnerability"  (Cook 
and Emerson  1978;  Cook,  Gillmore,  and 
Yamagishi 1986; Willer 1986). The measure 
with the widest empirical  support  is the Graph 
Power Index (GPI)  of Markovsky  et al. (1988). 
The four theories we examine go beyond the 
ordinal  predictions  of these efforts to the more 
difficult task of predicting  exact earnings  from 
exchanges between pairs of positions. All four 
theories assume actors are rational-they  at- 
tempt to  maximize  their payoffs  from ex- 
changes.  All but core theory make some addi- 
tional social psychological assumptions  about 
an actor's propensity to agree to particular 
terms  of exchange. Core theory  is a "strategic" 
theory  because it emphasizes  the purely strate- 
gic determinants  of the terms  of exchange.  The 
other three theories are "social psychological" 
theories  because, while they do not ignore stra- 
tegic determinants,  they augment them with 
social psychological  considerations.  (Details of 
each theory  are presented  in the Appendix.) 
Core Theory 
Core theory views exchanges in networks in 
terms of cooperative N-person game theory. 
Because exchanges provide value to actors, a 
set exchange agreement  assigns a payoff vec- 
tor to the set of actors.  Vectors  that meet three 
"rationality"  conditions  constitute  the "core"  of 
the exchange network  qua game. These condi- 
tions are individual,  subgroup  (coalition), and 
group rationality. Individual rationality de- 
mands that each actor's payoff be equal to or 
greater  than the payoff he or she can earn as a 
one-member  coalition (which is zero by defi- 
nition in exchange networks).  Coalition ratio- 
nality requires  that the sum of the payoffs to 
any subset of actors  is equal to or greater  than 
the sum of payoffs that the subset can obtain 
by exchange agreements  only among its mem- 
bers. Group rationality  is coalition rationality 
at the network  or complete group  level. 
The core of an exchange network  qua game 
may contain one, many, or no outcomes, that 
is,  the network may be strategically deter- 
mined, underdetermined,  or undetermined.  In 
general, the payoff schedule will favor some 
positions over others.5  In most cases, the ac- 
3 This task is formally equivalent to exchange 
formulated as an Edgeworth box problem (Edge- 
worth 1881). In Edgeworth's formulation,  both ac- 
tors can improve on their "initial"  endowment by 
exchanging  until some point  on the "contract  curve" 
is reached. At that point, any further  exchange ne- 
cessitates a decline in one actor's utility and an in- 
crease in the other's. Similarly, in the present  task, 
both actors gain from any agreement  because fail- 
ure to reach agreement  results  in no payoff to either 
actor. However, any agreement  that gives a larger 
share to one person necessarily gives  a smaller 
share to the other, as do exchanges along the con- 
tract  curve of the Edgeworth  box. 
4 Strategic  action refers to how subjects  use their 
potential power advantages.  Although strategic  ac- 
tion can affect the use  of  power, Molm (1990) 
showed that strategic action is unrelated  to struc- 
tural  advantage. 
5 For example, if  all positions exchange only 
once when dividing a 24-point pool, the simple A1- 804  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
tual payoffs to a particular  position in the core 
outcomes can vary widely. In one core out- 
come, a position may get 100 percent of the 
resources while in another  core outcome, that 
position may get 0 percent.  As a theory  of ex- 
change  outcomes,  core analysis  simply  predicts 
that  some core outcome will occur.  Because no 
specific social psychological principle is as- 
sumed, rationality  considerations  alone cannot 
always single out a particular  outcome from 
this set. This indeterminacy  makes compari- 
sons with approaches  that make point predic- 
tions difficult.  To compare  core theory  with the 
other three theories, we follow Skvoretz and 
Fararo  (1992) and assume that each core out- 
come is equally likely. Predictions  are the av- 
erage payoffs to the various positions, calcu- 
lated over the core outcomes. For exchange 
networks  that have no core outcomes (i.e., are 
strategically undetermined networks), core 
theory  makes  no  prediction,  although 
Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992) suggested 
that exchanges will be concluded but the bar- 
gaining will be unstable, "groups . . . should 
take longer to arrive at their agreements  and 
the patterns  should be more variable"  (p. 238). 
Equidependence  Theory 
In equidependence  theory,  ego evaluates  poten- 
tial exchanges with a particular  alter with two 
considerations  in mind:  How much  ego will get 
in an exchange with this alter,.and  how much 
ego could get in an exchange with some other 
partner.  The possible payoff from an alterna- 
tive partner  is ego's comparison  level for ex- 
changes with a given alter.  The difference  be- 
tween this level and alter's offer determines 
how dependent  ego is on exchanges with alter 
for favorable outcomes. Meanwhile, alter is 
evaluating exchanges with ego  in a similar 
fashion and thus evaluating his or her depen- 
dence on ego for favorable outcomes. When 
ego and alter  are  equally dependent  on their  re- 
lation for relatively  favorable  outcomes,  the re- 
lation is said to be equidependent.  Given ego's 
and alter's  comparison  levels, equidependence 
depends on the payoffs the two earn from ex- 
change with each other. 
An example given by Cook and Yamagishi 
(1992) illustrates  the idea. Suppose i and  j  are 
negotiating  over a 24-point pool and i has an- 
other  partner  who guarantees  i 10 points, while 
j has no other  partner.  If i and  j divide the pool 
at 13 for i and 11 for j,  actor i gets 3 points 
more than  her next best alternative  (10), while 
j gets 11  points  more  than  her  comparison  level 
of 0. Thus,  j is more  dependent  on i than  i is on 
j  and j  "will be more willing to give up re- 
sources  in order  to conclude a successful trans- 
action"  (Cook and  Yamagishi  1992, p. 247). In 
this example,  equidependence  is  achieved 
when i gets 17 points and  j gets 7 points be- 
cause then i and j  make 7 points more than 
their  next best alternatives. 
In networks  larger  than the dyad, this inter- 
dependent  evaluation  process goes on simulta- 
neously  in  each  of  the  network's  ties.6 
Equidependence theory's basic claim is that 
exchange  earnings  are  determined  when all ties 
in the network  have achieved equidependence 
by appropriate  adjustment  of the terms of ex- 
change in each of the network's ties. At this 
point, actor i's structural  power is defined as 
the maximum  profit i can get from any of his 
or her partners.  Observed earnings from ex- 
changes are expected to be proportional to 
structural  power. 
Expected Value  Theory 
Friedkin's (1986) expected value theory fol- 
lows from his general  conceptualization  of net- 
work  effects. A structure  defines a space of po- 
tential  networks,  each of which can be realized 
on a particular  occasion. Predictions about a 
structure's outcomes are then expected val- 
ues-outcome  values of a particular  network 
weighted by the probability  of its occurrence. 
In the present context, a particular  exchange 
B-A2 structure  has a single core outcome, namely, 
a payoff of 24 points to B and 0 to each of the As. 
Any other payoff assignment,  say, 23 to B, 1 to AI 
and 0 to A2 violates coalition rationality  for some 
subset, in this case, B and A2 because the sum of 
their payoffs is 23 which is less than  they could ob- 
tain by exchanging with each other. 
6 For example, in the simple Al-B-A2  network, 
equidependence  theory  predicts  B gets all 24 points 
in an exchange with an A. Each A has no alterna- 
tive and so has a comparison  level of 0. Receiving 
0 in an exchange with B makes A's dependence  on 
B equal to 0. For B, A2 is an alternative  to Al in 
which B receives 24 points. This establishes the 
comparison level for the 24 points received from 
an exchange with Al,  making B's dependence on 
AI equal to AI's dependence  on B, namely, 0. EXCLUSION  AND POWER  805 
network constitutes a structure and a maxi- 
mally complete exchange pattern,  i.e., one in 
which no further  exchanges are possible, con- 
stitutes one element in the space of potential 
networks.7 
The basic property  of interest  for each pair 
of actors i and  j, is whether  actor i's failure to 
exchange with actors implies that  actor  i is ex- 
cluded from any exchange.  Taken over all 
maximally  complete  outcomes,  this property- 
the degree to which actor i is excluded from 
any exchange because he or she fails to ex- 
change with actor  j-defines  the dependency 
of i on j. Dependency is the operative social 
psychological  consideration  for expected  value 
theory. Ego's aspirations  depend on ego's de- 
pendency on alter:  If ego's dependency  on al- 
ter is low, ego's  aspirations are high, and if 
ego's dependency on alter is high, ego's aspi- 
rations are low. Calculating  the dependencies 
of actors on one another  requires  an assump- 
tion about the likelihood of a particular  maxi- 
mally complete exchange pattern. Friedkin's 
baseline assumption  is that  all maximally  com- 
plete patterns associated with a network are 
equally likely.8 
Expected value theory assumes an offer- 
making  function  that  translates  a particular  de- 
gree of dependency into an offer to alter.  The 
predicted earnings from exchange are then a 
function  of the reciprocal  offers as modified  by 
compromises  when the offers are inconsistent. 
Unlike equidependence  theory,  there is no ex- 
plicit assumption  that these predicted  terms  of 
exchange equalize or balance  out, in a psycho- 
logical sense, the differential  dependencies  of 
actors on one another.  Nevertheless, differen- 
tial dependency focuses the aspirations  of ac- 
tors on a range of terms of exchange that are 
sensitive to their  dependency  on one another. 
Exchange-Resistance  Theory 
Network exchange-resistance  theory assigns a 
Graph  Power  Index (GPI)  score to each node in 
a network. GPI sums "nonintersecting"  paths 
from a node by adding  odd length  paths,  which 
are advantageous,  and subtracting  even length 
paths, which are disadvantageous.9  Relative 
GPI  scores  and  three  axioms  predict  with whom 
a position's occupant will seek to exchange. 
Agreements  are  assumed  to occur  only if actors 
mutually  seek to exchange.  The original  theory 
made only ordinal predictions  of earnings: If 
two positions have equal GPI scores, an equal 
division of points  is expected,  whereas  if i has a 
higher  GPI score than  j, i is expected  to receive 
a larger  share.  Subsequent  work (Markovsky  et 
al. 1993) identified GPIj  > GPI1j  as leading to 
strong  power  differences-extreme differentia- 
tion in earnings-and  extended the theory to 
predict "weak power" differences-moderate 
differences  in earnings-in  networks  in which 
structurally  dissimilar  positions have the same 
GPI score. Weak power occurs when the pat- 
tern of exchange-seeking  differentially  affects 
a node's likelihood of being included in an ex- 
change.  This extension  of the theory  is also lim- 
ited to ordinal  predictions. 
To make this approach comparable to the 
other three theories, we propose a parsimoni- 
ous model that unites the strong power and 
weak power analyses.  To produce  point predic- 
tions, we blend the exchange-seeking  assump- 
tions of GPI analysis with an actor's  resistance 
to  a  particular set  of  terms  of  exchange 
(Heckathorn  1980; Willer 1981).10  An actor's 
resistance to a set of terms declines as these 
terms become increasingly  favorable  (see Ap- 
pendix). In our unified model, the exchange- 
7 In the line network A-B-B-A,  there are two 
maximally  complete  exchange  patterns, one  in 
which two AB exchanges occur and one in which 
the two B positions exchange. In the second ex- 
change pattern,  even though  both A positions  do not 
exchange, the pattern is maximally complete be- 
cause the two A positions are not connected and 
thus no further  exchanges can be made. 
8 In the A1-B-A2 network,  the A1-B and the A2- 
B exchange patterns  are equally likely. B's depen- 
dency on either  A is 0 because B is never excluded, 
while each A's dependency on B is .5 because A 
fails to exchange with B and so is excluded 50 per- 
cent of the time. 
9 Odd length  indicates  advantage because  it 
means a node has alternatives  or a partner's  alter- 
natives also have alternatives  to one's partner  and 
so on. Even length indicates disadvantage  because 
it means a node has one or more rivals for the at- 
tention of a partner. 
10 Recent  work has used  resistance  concepts 
(Lovaglia, Skvoretz,  Willer, and Markovsky 1993). 
However, that work is not comparable  to the other 
three theories because it was developed to predict 
weak power "equilibrium"  rates  only. Resistance in 
our analysis provides a "baseline" model chosen 
more with an eye toward simplicity of calculation 
and comprehensiveness  of coverage than precise fit 
to a subset of exchange networks. 806  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
seeking activity implied by GPI analysis and 
its extension modify resistance  such that  a high 
probability  of exclusion lowers resistance  to a 
particular set of terms. GPI calculations are 
necessary to apply this model-the  relative 
scores determine  the pattern  of exchange-seek- 
ing activity and the resulting  likelihood of ex- 
clusion. However,  resistance  is the relevant  so- 
cial psychological consideration  for actors  that 
makes  point predictions  possible. Actors  make, 
accept,  or reject  offers based  on their  resistance 
to the proposed terms of exchange and con- 
verge on a set of terms to which both parties 
are equally  resistant. This point of  "equi- 
resistance"  exists and is uniquely  specified for 
all connected  pairs in a network.11 
Summary 
The theories  of  equidependence,  expected 
value, and exchange-resistance  are social psy- 
chological theories  because  they assume  actors 
are guided by more than simple rationality  in 
their  negotiations  with a particular  alter.  Actors 
are assumed  to be sensitive to their  alternatives 
(or lack thereof)  and  thus to the possibility  they 
can  "exit" from a particular relationship. 
Equidependence  theory emphasizes  the payoff 
from exit  (the comparison level);  expected 
value theory  highlights  the opportunities  to exit 
without incurring  costs (the probabilistic  con- 
cept of dependency);  and exchange-resistance 
theory  combines both considerations  through  a 
resistance  function that is  modified  by an 
actor's probability of being excluded. These 
assumptions  enable the theories  to "solve"  net- 
work structures  that  core theory,  which  is based 
solely  on the assumption of rational actors, 
leaves strategically  underdetermined  or unde- 
termined. 
METHODS  AND EXPERIMENTAL 
NETWORKS 
Subjects are undergraduates  at a large univer- 
sity who participated  for pay. All subjects re- 
ceived general  information  on the nature  of the 
experiments,  in particular,  that the aim was to 
study the effects of network  structure  on nego- 
tiation.  They were told that  each resource-pool 
consisted of 24 points, how each profit point 
would be translated  into money, and how ex- 
changes were to be made. Subjects negotiated 
through  ExNet, a system of networked  PCs, in 
a "full information"  design. The experimental 
network  was displayed at each subject station 
and the screen displayed and continually up- 
dated  the status  of all offers and completed  ex- 
changes.  Before the experiment,  subjects  were 
shown how to read the screen and how to 
make, accept, or reject and confirm offers. A 
short training  session tested their understand- 
ing of these directions,  followed by a practice 
session in which subjects  negotiated  with simu- 
lated others.  The practice  rounds  used a differ- 
ent network  than  the experimental  network  and 
the randomly generated actions of the simu- 
lated actors  were purposely  unrealistic  to avoid 
cuing effects. 
Each experimental  run was divided into pe- 
riods and rounds with periods. Each run of a 
particular  network involved a different group 
of subjects.  The run typically had as many pe- 
riods as positions in the network.  Each period 
was divided into four rounds.  Each round had 
a five-minute  time limit on negotiations.  Sub- 
jects changed  locations  in the network  between 
periods  in a manner  designed to permit  the es- 
timation of the effects  of particular subject 
pairs.  At the end of each round, subjects were 
told their  earnings  in that  round.  At the end of 
the experimental run, subjects were paid an 
amount  based on the points they earned. Sub- 
jects earned  an average  of $10.00. 
The eight experimental networks are dia- 
grammed  in Figure 1 and identified  by simpli- 
fied labels. The number  of circles around  a po- 
sition indicates the number  of exchanges the 
position can make per round. The number  of 
lines connecting  positions  indicates  the number 
of exchanges  per round  that  can occur  between 
the pair. Six networks are "unique-exchange" 
regimes  because,  as indicated  by the single lines 
between  nodes, only one exchange  per connec- 
tion is allowed per round. In these networks, 
positions that can make N > 1 exchanges per 
round  must make them with N others. 
I  In the A1-B-A2 network, the exchange-seek- 
ing activity as determined  by positions' relative  GPI 
scores implies  that B's  probability of being in- 
cluded is 1.00 while A's is .5. In the unified model, 
an 18/6 exchange favoring B is one for which B's 
resistance is low at .25 but still greater  than A's at 
.177. The point of equiresistance  is a 19.6/4.4 divi- 
sion, at which point the resistances  of A and B are 
equal at .183. EXCLUSION  AND POWER  807 
Unique-Exchange  Networks 
I  Line4 
Branch3l 
Kite  () 
Stem  (i) 
_  ~~~~~~~~~~~I 
DBranch2  (A) 
TB3 
Nonunique-Exchange  Networks 
NBranch2 
NT2 
Figure  1.  Experimental  Networks  Used  in the Analysis 
Two networks are nonunique-exchange  re- 
gimes. In NBranch2, A and B can make two 
exchanges  per  round  and  C can make  one, while 
A and B can exchange with each other twice 
per round.  In NT2, all positions can make two 
exchanges per  round  and  all pairs  can exchange 
with each other twice per round. In these net- 
works, negotiations for a pair's second ex- 
change begin after the first exchange is com- 
pleted; pairs cannot simultaneously negotiate 
the terms of the first and second exchanges.12 
In all networks,  actors  connected  to several  oth- 
ers can negotiate  simultaneously  with  each part- 
ner.  The derivation  of predictions  from each of 
the four theories is  straightforward for the 
unique-exchange  networks,  whereas  each 
theory  must  be extended  to cover the nonunique 
networks (details are presented  in the Appen- 
dix). 
To compare predictions with observations 
we estimated the effects of network position 
12 Several considerations  motivated  the choice of 
networks. Four of the networks are of long-stand- 
ing interest.  The Branch3  1 and Line4 structures  are 
among the simplest of the strong power and weak 
power networks, respectively; Stem and Kite are 
controversial  weak power networks  (Yamagishi and 
Cook 1990; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1990). 808  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
from the observed points earned  by exchange. 
Because particular  agreements could involve 
the same pair of subjects, point earnings are 
analyzed as a variant  of a repeated  measures, 
correlated  observations  problem  (Skvoretz  and 
Willer 1991; Winer 1962). The units of obser- 
vation  are  particular  subject  pairs  that  can com- 
plete a series of exchanges. A particular  pair 
can contribute  more than one exchange agree- 
ment to the total set of observations.  A con- 
strained regression technique is used to esti- 
mate the effects of network  position  and,  where 
possible, the effects of particular  subject  pair- 
ings. The analytical  procedure  is a variant  of a 
procedure  used in previous research  (Skvoretz 
and Willer 1991; Markovsky  et al. 1993). 
In the original procedure, Yi  refers to the 
number  of points earned  by one member  of the 
pair that completes  the ith agreement. The 
earnings  of the same subject  in a pair must be 
used to code all agreements  made by that  pair. 
We index subjects  by numerals  so that Yi  refers 
to the earnings of the subject with the higher 
index number  in the pair  making  the ith agree- 
ment. For each pair that could complete an 
agreement, there is  a 0/1  variable denoted 
V(x,y)  . For the ith agreement,  V(x,y)  = 1 if that 
agreement  is between subjects  x and  y and oth- 
erwise, V(x,y)  = 0. For  each structurally  distinct 
exchange relation involving structurally  dis- 
tinct positions, there  is an indicator  variable  Zk. 
For the ith agreement,  Zk = 1 if the subject  with 
the higher  index value occupies the advantaged 
position; Zk  =  -1  if he or she occupies the dis- 
advantaged  position;  and  Zk = 0 otherwise  (i.e., 
when the ith agreement  is between  persons  not 
in the kth structurally  distinct exchange rela- 
tion).  The  choice  of  which  position  is 
advantaged  is arbitrary  but must remain con- 
stant  over the coding of agreements.  (If a posi- 
tion initially  coded as advantaged  is in fact dis- 
advantaged,  then the effect of Zk will be nega- 
tive.) Structurally  distinct  positions are  denoted 
in Figure 1 by different  letters, and thus struc- 
turally  distinct  exchange  relations  must  involve 
different  pairs of letters. The basic estimation 
equation  is: 
Y  = 12 +  X,  7(x,  y) +  X  kZk +  E,  (1) 
in which a linear relation  is assumed between 
the various independent  variables and the ex- 
change earnings. 
The parameter 7US,  represents  the effect of 
the individual  pair of subject  x with subject  y; 
the parameter  Sk  represents  the effect of struc- 
tural  position in the kth  structurally  distinct  ex- 
change  relation.  The intercept  is constrained  to 
the baseline earnings  of 12 points. This allows 
subject pair effects and position effects to be 
interpreted  as additions  to or subtractions  from 
the even split of 12/12. In certain cases (e.g., 
when few exchanges occur between particular 
positions),  it may not be possible to disentangle 
the effects of network position from the sub- 
ject pair effects. In such cases, simple means 
are reported. 
We used a variation  on this procedure  that 
calculates,  for each subject  pair,  the mean val- 
ues of Y  for each combination  of structural  con- 
ditions indexed by the Zk  variables. We then 
estimated a constrained regression equation 
weighting each data point by the number of 
agreements that entered into its calculation. 
This procedure  gives the same estimates  of the 
structural  parameter  Sk,  but yields larger  stan- 
dard errors  for these estimates.13  Larger  stan- 
dard  errors  are appropriate  at this early stage of 
theoretical  predictions  of exact earnings from 
exchange  where  the danger  lies more in prema- 
ture rejection  of valuable ideas than in the ac- 
ceptance  of an incorrect  hypothesis. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 lists  the number and types  of  ex- 
changes observed in each experimental net- 
13 The standard  errors  increase  because  we are 
throwing  out  degrees  of freedom  identified  with  the 
multiple  observations  on a single  pair  in a particu- 
lar  combination  of structural  conditions. 
The remaining four networks extend the scope of 
research in two ways: (1) they allow variation in 
the number  of exchanges a position can make, and 
(2) they introduce  networks  that allow multiple  ex- 
changes per round  between connected  pairs.  The T- 
shaped networks have played an important  role in 
the history of network  exchange research,  motivat- 
ing both theoretical  and empirical  work (see Cook, 
Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi 1983; Willer 
1986; Cook et al. 1986). The NBranch2  structure  is 
the simplest nonunique  network  that  has no unique- 
exchange counterpart.  Finally, the DBranch2  struc- 
ture is the first multiple-exchange  network  to be re- 
searched that should exhibit the effects of weak 
power.  Previous  investigations  of  this  effect 
(Markovsky et al. 1993) have been limited to the 
Kite and Stem unique networks. EXCLUSION  AND POWER  809 
Table 1. Number and Types of Exchanges by Network Structure 
Number of  Number  of  Number  of 
Network  Periods  Groups  Exchanges  Type of Exchange 
Branch3l  4  5  80  80 AB 
Line4  4  5  134  120 AB, 14 BB 
Stem  4  4  116  53 AB, 8 AC, 55 CC 
Kite  5  4  158  47 AB, 111 AA 
DBranch2  6  5  423  410 AB, 13 BB 
TB3  5  4  218  140 AB, 34 BC, 44 CD 
NBranch2  6  4  236  143 AB, 93 BC 
NT2  5  4  307  155 AB, 4 BC, 148 CD 
work. Each group was composed of subjects 
who had prior experience negotiating with 
other subjects (rather  than  simulated  actors)  in 
other network  structures.14 
Table 2 compares  predictions  from the four 
theories with observations.  The general  pattern 
of experimental  results is consistent with pre- 
vious research.  Power advantage  is extreme  in 
strong power relations, such as the A-B  rela- 
tion in the Branch31 network.  Only a modest 
advantage is found in the weak power net- 
works-Line4,  Stem, Kite, and DBranch2. 
Changing B's permitted  number  of exchanges 
from one to three in TB3 changes the relative 
advantage  of all positions in a way anticipated 
by Markovsky  et al. (1988) for a seven-person 
network. The NT2 network behaves much as 
did the  simple  T network also  studied by 
Markovsky  et al. (1988). Finally,  although  the 
results for NBranch2  have no precedent  in the 
literature,  the general intuition that B has an 
advantage  in both relations  is confirmed. 
The exchange-resistance  model is the best 
fitting model-it  has the smallest mean devia- 
tion from estimated advantage, 1.37 points, 
when deviations are weighted by the number 
of exchanges. Equidependence  is the better  of 
the two remaining social psychological theo- 
ries with an average deviation of 2.66 points. 
Expected value theory has an average devia- 
tion over 3 points.  The place of core theory  de- 
pends on the value assigned to its "no rate" 
cells. If core theory is penalized by assigning 
these cells a score of 0, it has the second worst 
fit (2.88 points); but if these cells are assigned 
a score of 12, it is second best at 2.40 points. If 
we consider  the number  of predictions  that  fall 
within  two standard  errors  of the estimated  ad- 
vantage, core theory fits worst (regardless  of 
how empty cells are handled)-only  one of its 
11 predictions  falls in this range.  Exchange-re- 
sistance  theory has five  of  14 predictions 
within this range, equidependence  theory has 
four,  and  expected value theory  has three.  That 
core theory fits least well is not surprising-it 
makes fewer assumptions  than  the other three. 
That exchange-resistance theory fits best is 
also, perhaps,  to be expected because it uses 
exit costs and opportunities  to make its predic- 
tions, whereas  the other  two social psychologi- 
cal theories  use only one of these factors. 
Although exchange-resistance theory fits 
best of the four theories, nine of its 14 predic- 
tions are outside two standard  errors  of the es- 
timated advantage.  Because there is room for 
improvement,  we propose  some variants  of the 
present  models.  These variants  explore  the idea 
that better fits can be obtained by taking into 
account  the actual  frequencies  of exclusion ex- 
perienced  by actors. 
REFORMULATION  OF THE THEORIES 
We drop  core theory  from  further  consideration 
and focus on the three  theories  that  employ so- 
cial  psychological  principles  because  they 
make explicit point predictions for all  net- 
works.  The three  theories  emphasize  the impor- 
tance of exclusion and its consequences in the 
determination of  earnings from exchange. 
However, there are two  different paths by 
14 Time and budget constraints  necessitated us- 
ing subjects in more than one network.  Overall, 97 
different individuals were used in the 35 different 
experimental  groups listed in Table 1. 810  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
Table 2.  Points Earned  by Advantaged  Positions by Network Relation:  Predictions  From Four Theories Versus Esti- 
mates From Experiments 
Theory (Predicted  Points) 
Network  Equi-  Exchange-  Expected  Number of  Estimated 
Network  Relationc  Core  dependence  Resistance  Value  Exchanges  Points (SE) 
Branch3l  B/A  24.0  24.0  21.2*  22.0*  80  21.63 
(.49) 
Line4  B/A  16.0  16.0  16.0  21.1  120  14.05 
(.40) 
Stem  B/A  20.1  18.0  18.3  22.0  53  15.29 
(.82) 
B/C  a  14.4*  15.2*  19.5*  8  16.49 
(2.64) 
Kite  B/A  a  12.0  12.5  12.0  47  14.05 
(.77) 
DBranch2  B/A  16.8  16.0*  14.6  20.2  410  15.50 
(.41) 
TB3  B/A  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  140  13.53 
(.45) 
C/B  24.0  24.0  21.8  21.1  34  17.88 
(1.01)b 
C/D  24.0  24.0  16.0*  21.1  44  17.72 
(.93) 
NBranch2  B/A  18.0  24.0  17.9  18.3  143  16.12 
(.53) 
B/C  24.0  24.0  16.0  21.1  93  17.76 
(.67) 
NT2  B/A  24.0  24.0  19.6  21.8  155  20.67 
(.49) 
B/C  a  16.0*  12.0*  12.0*  4  16.50 
(2.40)b 
C/D  12.0*  12.0*  12.0*  17.4  148  12.86 
(.70) 
Weighted average absolute  2.40  2.66  1.37  3.54 
deviation from estimated  (2.88) 
* The null hypothesis that the estimated points equal the predicted  points cannot be rejected at the .05 level. 
a No prediction because the network has no core outcome (e.g., Kite) or no exchange is possible between the two 
positions. To compute the deviation, a value of 12 or (0) is assigned to these cells. 
b Simple estimate from mean values; all other estimates control for the effects of particular  subject pairs. 
c First position is the advantaged  position. 
d Weights are the number  of exchanges. 
which network structure  can affect exchange 
earnings  differentials  through  exclusion. 
In one path, earnings differentials are pro- 
duced  by  the  built-in potential  for exclusion, 
which varies among network  positions.  For ex- 
ample, in the Line4 network,  the Bs, confident 
of never being excluded, bargain  harder  than 
the As who recognize the risk of demanding 
too  much. Thus, As  make concessions,  Bs 
make demands, and terms of exchange come 
to favor  the Bs even if no exclusion occurs.  Be- 
cause differential  power is a consequence of 
possibilities of the network structure,  it is in- 
dependent of  actual exclusion. Therefore, a 
priori probabilities of exclusion are the best 
predictors of  positions'  earnings from ex- 
changes. This model is most compatible with 
an actor  who rationally  infers consequences, a EXCLUSION  AND POWER  811 
"forward-looking actor" in Macy's  (1990) 
terms. 
In a second path,  earnings  differentials  result 
because actors who are excluded adjust their 
offers upward while actors who are consis- 
tently included adjust their offers downward. 
Here concessions and demands  are both direct 
consequences of actual events. In the Line4 
network,  Bs are never excluded and thus they 
never make concessions, but the As are ex- 
cluded, and when they are  excluded  they make 
better  offers to the Bs. As a result,  the terms  of 
exchange between an A and a B will favor the 
B position.  Because differential  power  is a con- 
sequence of  actually being excluded or in- 
cluded, its best predictors  are  the observed  fre- 
quencies. This model is most compatible  with 
an actor who rationally  adjusts  to past experi- 
ence, a "backward-looking"  actor in Macy's 
(1990) terms. 
The previous section examined  the network- 
specific "exclusion potential" version of the 
three social psychological theories. The ex- 
change-resistance  and expected value theories 
clearly base their predictions  on assumptions 
about a priori probabilities. Exchange-resis- 
tance theory  uses the probabilities  of being in- 
cluded to modify the resistance function; ex- 
pected value theory uses the exclusion prob- 
abilities to calculate dependency scores. In 
equidependence theory, the relevant a priori 
assumption  is the setting  of an actor's  compari- 
son level, i.e., actors face an.  a priori  dichoto- 
mous probability  of being excluded  of 0 (if they 
have alternatives)  or 1 (if they have no alterna- 
tives). 
We now consider  the "actual  exclusion"  ver- 
sion of these theories  to predict  power  differen- 
tials produced  by different  network  structures. 
If the potential for exclusion causes power,  the 
theories will predict best when using a priori 
probabilities.  If actual exclusion causes power, 
the theories will predict best when using ob- 
served frequencies  of exclusion. If both  factors 
cause power, then each theory's predictions 
may or may not be improved depending on 
which mechanism  is implicit  in the theory.  Us- 
ing observed  frequencies  of exclusion will give 
different  predictions  if they (or related  quanti- 
ties) differ from their corresponding  a priori 
values. Table 3 presents, for exchange-resis- 
tance theory, observed and a priori probabili- 
ties of being included;  Table  4 presents,  for ex- 
pected value theory,  observed and a priori  de- 
Table 3.  Potential and Observed Probabilities of Being 
Included  by  Position  in  the  Network:  Ex- 
change-Resistance  Theory 
Position in  Probability  of Being Included 
Network  Network  Potential  Observed 
Branch3l  A  .333  .333 
B  1.000  1.000 
Line4  A  .750  .750 
B  1.000  .925 
Stem  A  .600  .828 
B  1.000  .923 
C  .800  .922 
Kite  A  .795  .841 
B  .821  .588 
DBranch2  A  .833  .872 
B  1.000  .908 
TB3  A  1.000  .875 
B (in A/B)  1.000  .875 
B (in B/C)  .250  .400 
C  1.000  .975 
D  .750  .575 
NBranch2  A  .625  .578 
B  1.000  .938 
C  .750  .719 
NT2  A  .500  .484 
B  1.000  .994 
C  1.000  .950 
D  1.000  .925 
pendency  scores.  For  both  tables,  observed  val- 
ues can differ substantially  from a priori  calcu- 
lations. Clearly,  for positions that  have alterna- 
tives, the probability  of exchange with one of 
these alternatives  is almost  never 1-the  a priori 
assumption  of equidependence  theory. 
Predictions  from the structural  potential for 
exclusion version of exchange-resistance  and 
expected value theories are easily modified to 
take observed frequencies into account. Be- 
cause both have terms  that  refer  to relative  fre- 
quencies of various  events related  to observed 
exclusions, we simply substitute  the observed 
values -for the a priori values.15  Predictions 
from equidependence  theory are modified by 
weighting what ego would receive from any 
alternative  by the observed relative frequency 
15 Friedkin (forthcoming) recommends exactly 
this procedure for applications of expected value 
theory  when the information  on relative  frequencies 
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Table 4.  Potential and Observed Dependency Scores by 
Network Relation: Expected Value Theory 
Dependency Score 
Network  Relation  Potential  Observed 
Branch3l  AB  .667  .667 
BA  .000  .000 
Line4  AB  .500  .250 
BA  .000  .075 
Stem  AB  .667  .172 
BA  .000  .047 
BC  .333  .078 
CB  .000  .047 
Kite  AB  .200  .159 
BA  .200  .412 
DBranch2  AB  .400  .146 
BA  .000  .092 
TB3  AB  .000  .125 
BA  .000  .083 
BC  .500  .200 
CB  .000  .025 
CD  .000  .025 
DC  .500  .425 
NBranch2  AB  .250  .422 
BA  .000  .063 
BC  .000  .005 
CB  .500  .281 
NT2  AB  .600  .513 
BA  .000  .006 
BC  .000  .006 
CB-  .000  .050 
CD  .000  .050 
DC  .200  .075 
that the particular  alter exchanges with ego.16 
Table 5 presents  these modified  predictions. 
The effect of using actual  frequencies  of ex- 
clusion varies substantially among theories. 
For exchange-resistance theory, the average 
deviation increases from 1.37 to 1.88 points, 
but two more predictions  (for a total of seven) 
are within  two standard  errors  of the estimated 
advantage. For equidependence theory, im- 
provement  is made  on both  counts-five  rather 
than four of the 14 predictions  are within two 
standard  errors  of the estimated  advantage  and 
the average deviation decreases from 2.66 to 
2.38 points. The expected value model shows 
striking improvement:  The average deviation 
decreases  dramatically  from 3.54 to 1.36 points 
and nine of its 14 predictions  fall within two 
standard errors of  the estimated advantage. 
These results suggest that:  (1) exchange-resis- 
tance theory emphasizes the structural  poten- 
tial for exclusion as a cause of power; (2) ex- 
pected value theory emphasizes experienced 
exclusion; and (3) equidependence  theory  uses 
both the structural  potential  for exclusion and 
experienced  exclusion. The general  conclusion 
is that both forms of exclusion can produce 
power differentials. 
This conclusion is supported  by the data in 
Table  5, which show that  all three  theories  have 
difficulty accounting for earnings advantages 
in the weak power networks (Line4,  Kite, 
DBranch2 and, to a lesser degree, Stem). In 
these networks, no position is systematically 
excluded  from  exchange.17 As expected,  the es- 
timated advantages  are relatively modest, but 
even so the "experienced  exclusion" models 
consistently  predict  less advantage  than is ob- 
served-13  out of 15 predictions.  Further,  for 
the Kite network,  all three  "experienced  exclu- 
sion" models predict,  contrary  to observation, 
that the B position is at a disadvantage  in ex- 
changes  with  the  As.  This  pattern  of 
underprediction and misprediction suggests 
that advantage in weak power networks is 
sensitive to differences  in positions'  potentials 
for being excluded and  that  experienced  exclu- 
sion is not necessary to produce such advan- 
tage. 
CONCLUSION 
We evaluated  four  recent  theories  of power dis- 
tribution  in exchange  networks,  one purely  stra- 
tegic theory and three social psychological 
theories.  We examined  eight different  networks 
16 This  modification  follows  an unpublished 
analysis proposed by Yamagishi (1993) that pro- 
vides an algorithm  for calculating equidependence 
predictions.  The algorithm  introduces  a priori  prob- 
abilities into the determination  of an actor's com- 
parison level and abandons  the assumption  that an 
ego and ego's next best alternative  are sure to ex- 
change. Our analysis uses observed frequencies in 
a way generally consistent with Yamagishi's algo- 
rithm. 
17 These networks  contrast  sharply with a strong 
power network like Branch31 in which two of the 
three A positions are systematically excluded on 
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Table 5.  Points Earned  by Advantaged Positions by Network Relation: Predictions From Three Modifed Theories 
Versus Estimates  From Experiments 
Theory (Predicted  Points) 
Network  Equi-  Exchange-  Expected  Number  of  Estimated 
Network  Relationb  dependence  Resistance  Value  Exchanges  Points (SE) 
Branch3l  B/A  24.0  21.2*  22.0*  80  21.63 
(.49) 
Line4  B/A  13.0  15.0  15.8  120  14.05 
(.40) 
Stem  B/A  12.5  14.1*  15.2*  53  15.29 
(.82) 
B/C  12.6*  12.5*  12.9*  8  16.49 
(2.64) 
Kite  B/A  8.1  7.2  10.1  47  14.05 
(.77) 
DBranch2  B/A  12.3  12.6  13.4  410  15.50 
(.41) 
TB3  B/A  12.0  12.0  13.1*  140  13.53 
(.45) 
C/B  18.9*  20.5  16.5*  34  17.88 
(1.01)a 
C/D  13.8  18.4*  19.6  44  17.72 
(.93) 
NBranch2  B/A  19.1  18.0  18.5  143  16.12 
(.53) 
B/C  14.2  15.7  18.5*  93  17.76 
(.67) 
NT2  B/A  19.8*  19.7*  21.0*  155  20.67 
(.49) 
B/C  16.9*  12.7*  13.5*  4  16.50 
(2.40)a 
C/D  12.1*  12.4*  12.7*  148  12.86 
(.70) 
Weighted average absolute  2.38  1.88  1.36 
deviation from estimated 
* The null hypothesis that the estimated points equal the predicted  points cannot be rejected at the .05 level. 
a Simple estimate from mean values; all other estimates control for the effects of particular  subject pairs. 
b First position listed is advantaged  position. 
c Deviations are weighted by the number  of exchanges. 
and tested two different versions of the three 
social psychological theories, a "structural  po- 
tential for exclusion" version and an "experi- 
enced exclusion" version. The best theory is 
exchange-resistance theory when predictions 
are based solely on structurally  determined  po- 
tentials for exclusion, i.e., on a priori  calcula- 
tions of differential  probabilities  of exclusion 
(and related  quantities)  faced by different  posi- 
tions in a network.  When predictions  use ob- 
served  instances  of exclusion  (and  related  quan- 
tities), expected value theory  is the best theory. 
Further,  expected value theory is the only so- 
cial psychological theory whose fit is substan- 
tially improved  by taking into account the ob- 
served frequencies of exclusion. Our conclu- 
sion highlights  (1) the role played by differen- 
tial  chances  of exclusion  in the genesis of power 
differentials;  (2) the significance  of weak  power 
networks  for further  research  on power distri- 
bution  in exchange  networks;  and,  (3) informa- 
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cess by which a network's  structural  potential 
for exclusion impacts  on exchange outcomes. 
Our study strongly suggests that  power dis- 
tribution in exchange networks is  sensitive 
both to the potential for exclusion and to ac- 
tual exclusion. Generally,  actors who are less 
often excluded earn more from exchange and, 
hence, exercise power in negotiations  with ac- 
tors who are more often excluded. But the in- 
fluence of differences in the structural  poten- 
tial for exclusion cannot be ruled  out: In weak 
power networks,  differences  in the potential  for 
exclusion augment  the differentiation  in power 
derived from actual exclusion. In one excep- 
tional case-the  Kite network-the  structural 
potential for exclusion overrides the effect of 
differences in experienced exclusion. Even 
though  the central  actor  B is excluded  from  ex- 
change more than  twice as often as the periph- 
eral  A actors (41 percent  versus 16 percent),  B 
nevertheless earns moderately  more points in 
exchange with actors  in the A positions (14.05 
versus 9.95 points). 
Of course, this interpretation  assumes that 
the structural  potential  for exclusion favors B. 
In fact, only exchange-resistance  theory sug- 
gests that  A has a slightly greater  potential  for 
exclusion than B and so provides a basis for 
B's greater  earnings. (However, its prediction 
based on this difference in structural  potential 
underestimates B's  advantage.) Fortunately, 
other general theoretical  arguments  can be ap- 
plied to this anomaly.  Burt's  (1992) concept of 
"structural  holes" adds theoretical grounding 
for the expectation that a structural  potential 
can override actual events in their  joint deter- 
mination of exchange outcomes. In the Kite 
network,  Burt would argue,  B's advantage  de- 
rives from the fact that  there  are  four structural 
holes in B's primary  network (of six possible 
holes) while each A's primary  network  has no 
structural  holes. The total constraint  on the B 
position is substantially  less than  that  on the A 
position (.56 versus .78), and  the constraint  that 
a particular  A places on the B position is much 
less than the B position places on that  A posi- 
tion (.14  versus  .39).  Therefore, following 
Burt, A's demands  on B would be more nego- 
tiable from B's perspective than B's demands 
on A would be from  A's perspective.  Therefore, 
B's greater  earnings  from exchanges with an  A 
are no surprise. 
In general, the four theories do less well in 
accounting for power differentials in weak 
power networks than in strong power net- 
works. Before the discovery of weak power, 
only two power conditions were recognized: 
Either there were power differentials-now 
termed strong-and  earnings from exchange 
dramatically favored high power actors, or 
power was equal and so were earnings.  Predic- 
tions were evaluated  simply by testing whether 
earnings  differed  from the baseline  of equal di- 
vision. Furthermore,  in strong or equal power 
networks,  potential  exclusion and actual  exclu- 
sion could not be disentangled.  In strong  power 
networks, low power actors were potentially 
excludable and necessarily were excluded. In 
equipower networks (e.g., an isolated dyad), 
neither  actor  could exclude the partner  without 
cost and so no exclusion occurred. Because 
earnings of actors in advantaged  positions in 
weak power networks fall between these ex- 
tremes and are different  in different  networks, 
weak power networks  place greater  demands 
on theory and theories must now supply point 
predictions.  More important,  however, unlike 
other  types of networks,  weak power networks 
permit  a decoupling of the structural  potential 
for exclusion from actual  frequencies  of exclu- 
sion. These networks  enable researchers  to in- 
vestigate  the conditions  under  which one or the 
other  or both of these mechanisms  account  for 
exchange rate  differentials. 
Finally, future research should use weak 
power networks  to systematically  explore the 
relationship  between information  and the de- 
velopment  of power.  None of the four theories 
qualifies its predictions by considering infor- 
mation  conditions.  Yet theorists  have long sus- 
pected that information  available  to actors  can 
influence  power differentials.  For example, ac- 
tors need more complete information  to act on 
structural  potentials for exclusion than on ac- 
tual exclusions. Although our results suggest 
that  either  mechanism  can produce  power, our 
experiments  were conducted  in an open infor- 
mation  context in which actors  knew how their 
positions  were connected  in the larger  network. 
With this information,  subjects could make a 
cognitive assessment  of their  chances of exclu- 
sion and calibrate  their behavior accordingly. 
However,  we have no evidence that  they make 
such assessments or that the effect of a struc- 
tural  potential for exclusion requires  such as- 
sessments.  Perhaps  other  mechanisms  underlie 
the effects of a structural  potential for exclu- 
sion on power distribution  in information-poor EXCLUSION  AND POWER  815 
environments  or in information-rich  environ- 
ments with unobservant subjects. Certainly, 
exploration of the role of information  should 
be conducted using weak power networks as 
they alone allow the structural  potential  for ex- 
clusion to be decoupled from actual instances 
of exclusion and  thus  permit  systematic  exami- 
nation  of the catalytic  effect of information. 
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APPENDIX 
Core Theory 
To identify the core in a network, each subset of 
positions is assigned  a value based on the total  num- 
ber of exchanges possible in the subset and the size 
of the pool to be divided (typically 24 points). This 
mapping from a subset of positions to its value is 
called the characteristic  function of the exchange 
network qua game. For instance, in the Branch31 
network,  any {Ai,B,Aj} triple  has the same value as 
an {  Ai,B } pair, namely 24, because in both cases B 
can divide a 24-point pool with only one of the As. 
In the Line4 network, the complete set of actors 
{A,B,B,A  } has a value of 48 because two exchang- 
es are possible within the set of four actors (two 
AB  exchanges)  and each exchange is  worth 24 
points. Once the characteristic  function is defined, 
core payoff assignments  are those assignments  that 
meet the three rationality  conditions. For instance, 
the Branch31 outcome in which B gets 22 points, 
Al gets 2 points and A2 and A3 get 0 points is not a 
core outcome because the sum of B's  payoff and 
A2's payoff is less than 24, the value of the {A2,B} 
subset. In the Line4 network,  the outcome in which 
the B's divide the pool evenly at 12/12 and the A's 
receive 0 is not a core outcome because the total 
payoff to each {A,B} subset coalition is less than 
its value of 24. 
Branch3  I's one core outcome occurs when B re- 
ceives  all 24 points and the As receive 0 points. 
This is the only payoff assignment  that satisfies the 
three rationality  conditions. B's  strong advantage 
derives from its strategic location with respect to 
subset values-B  must be included in any subset 
for the subset to have a positive value. This is not 
true for any A position. The B positions are advan- 
taged in Line4 in a more subtle way. Because the B 
positions are connected, any core outcome must 
have payoffs to the B positions that total 24 points 
or more. Because the A positions are not connect- 
ed, their point total can be less than 24. B's advan- 
tage in Line4 derives from  its strategic  location with 
respect  to coalition rationality-it  has a nonzero al- 
ternative  to its coalition with A. However, the ad- 
vantage is not as extreme as in Branch31 because 
the group  rationality  condition ensures  that  the core 
outcomes give nonzero payoffs to the A positions. 
The core outcomes for each of the unique-ex- 
change networks are defined by a set of inequali- 
ties that  payoff vectors for core outcomes must sat- 
isfy.  Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992)  specified 
the inequalities for the first four experimental  net- 
works. For DBranch2,  the relevant inequalities are 
B1 + B2 ?24;  Al + B1 + A2  ?48;  A3+  B2+  A4  ?48; 
Ai+B1  + B2>48  fori=  1,2,3,4;  Al +  B1 +  B2+  Ai 
? 72 and A2 + B  + B2 + Ai>  72 for i =  3,4. There 
are  70,525 core outcomes that  satisfy these inequal- 
ities-each  A receives an average  payoff of 7.2 and 
each B receives 16.8 points in an exchange with A. 
The TB3 network has 625 core outcomes because 
each A's payoff can vary from 0 to 24, determining 
B's payoff between 0 and 48, while C's payoff is 
fixed at 24 and D's at 0. 
In the nonunique-exchange  networks,  our exten- 
sion of Bienenstock and Bonacich's work assumes 
that the sequential  aspect of the exchange protocol 
can be ignored. This means that a pair that can ne- 
gotiate two 24-point deals per round  is treated  as if 
it is negotiating  only one deal worth  48 points. For 
the NBranch2 network,  the inequalities that define 
the core are:  A + B ? 48 and B + C ? 24. B's aver- 
age earnings are 36 points, A's  12 points, and C 
earns  nothing.  For the NT2 network,  the 1,875 core 
outcomes are those in which A,  = A2 =  0, B = 48 
and C + D = 48, so C and D each average  12 points. 
Equidependence  Theory 
Actor i's profit in an exchange with actor  j, denot- 
ed Rij,  is.i's agreed share of the resource  pool. Ac- 
tor i's dependence on actor  j, Dij, is the difference 
between the profit i gets in an i-j exchange and the 
quantity  Aij  which is the profit i gets from his or her 
mth best alternative  where m is the number  of ex- 
changes i is allowed. If i has only one exchange, 
then Aij  can be defined by the equation: 
Al,  =  maxky  { Rik}  *  (A-1) 
The equidependence principle states that ex- 
change earnings are determined by the point at 816  AMERICAN  SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
which the dependence of i on j equals the depen- 
dence of j on i throughout  the network, i.e., where 
Dij = Dji for all connected pairs i and  j. For the six 
unique-exchange  networks, the equidependence 
point is easy to calculate using the basic algorithm 
described in Cook and Yamagishi (1992). The al- 
gorithm  begins with each pool divided equally, cal- 
culates the Aij values, then adjusts the Rij values, 
then recalculates the Aij values and adjusts the Rj 
values and so on until they converge. For instance, 
for the Line4 network, the algorithm converges 
in  20  step  to  the  solution  RA1B1  =RA2B2  = 8, 
RBIA1 = RB2A2 = 16, and RB1B2  =  RB2B, = 8 in which 
A has structural  power 8 and B has structural  pow- 
er 16.a 
In nonunique-exchange  networks,  unlike unique- 
exchange networks,  some alternative  exchanges are 
exchanges with the same partner.  The question is 
whether such alternatives  should be used in deter- 
mining the comparison level  for a particular  ex- 
change with that partner.  The answer  must be "no," 
otherwise actors could bid against themselves. The 
problem only arises when an actor's connection to 
another  could have more exchanges per round  than 
the actor is allowed. In that case, the "extra"  ex- 
change capacity of the connection is irrelevant  and 
does not provide genuine alternatives. The algo- 
rithm  is easily modified to take this restriction  into 
account. The simplest procedure  confines connec- 
tions to the smaller of the total exchanges the part- 
ners can make. Then each partner's  mth best alter- 
native, necessarily, is exchange with some other 
partner. 
In the NBranch2 network, A can make two ex- 
changes so A's comparison level to either one of 
these exchanges is determined  not by the next best 
alternative  but by the second best alternative,  which 
is  0 because A has no second best alternative.  C 
a This solution  for the Line4 network  makes  some 
technically  problematic  claims. First,  the payoff pre- 
dictions for some pairs of positions are inconsistent 
with  the  pool division  interpretation.  In Line4,  accord- 
ing to the Rij values, BI earns 8 points in exchange 
with B2 and so too does B2, despite  the fact that the 
pool size is 24 points. To circumvent  this problem, 
Cook and  Yamagishi  invoke  the structural  power  con- 
cept and assume that exchange  earnings  are propor- 
tional to structural  power:  The Bs are power equals 
and are predicted  to divide at 12/12. But using those 
predicted  earnings  as the operative  Rij  values violates 
the equidependence  principle:  A's next best alterna- 
tive to 8 from B is 0, for a dependence  score of 8, 
while B's next  best alternative  to 16 from  A is 12 from 
the other  B for a dependence  score  of 4. The algorithm 
is easily modified  to avoid  these  inconsistencies.  How- 
ever,  to remain  faithful  to the  published  record,  we use 
the original  unmodified  algorithm. 
can make one exchange, so C's comparison  level is 
the next best alternative, which is also 0.  B can 
make  two exchanges  but  has three  opportunities  and 
so has a nonzero second best alternative  to any one 
of the three. The equidependence  point gives B 24 
points in any of B's three exchanges-the  depen- 
dence of A on B and B on A equal 0, as do the 
dependence  of B on C and C on B. (To be consis- 
tent with the sequential structure  of the exchange 
regime, this prediction requires that B's  first ex- 
change be with A. If it were with C, the result  is an 
isolated dyad whose equidependence  point is a 12/ 
12 division.) The NT2 network is solved similar- 
ly-B  gets 24 points in an exchange with either A 
and 16 points in either  exchange with C, and C gets 
12 points in either exchange with D. 
Expected Value Theory 
In expected value theory, the dependency  of actor i 
on actor  j, dij,  is defined as the joint probability  that 
i is excluded from an exchange and i does not ex- 
change with  j.b  The dependency  of i on j affects the 
"offer"  i makes to j in accord with the following 
equation  (for a 24-point pool): 
t = 24 -  231  d-d  (A-2) 
Thus if dij  = 0, i offers 1 point to j and claims 23 
points, whereas  if dii  = 1, then i offers 23 points to j 
and claims only 1 point. Actor  j's offer to i is deter- 
mined in a similar manner.  Further  assumptions  re- 
solve situations  in which the claims do not sum ex- 
actly to the pool size. In particular,  (1) if the sum 
exceeds the pool size, actors "split-the-difference" 
and agree on the average of their two offers (so i 
gets one-half of the sum of his or her claim and  j9  s 
offer); (2) if both actors  claim less than  one-half the 
pool size, they agree on a 12/12 division; and, (3) if 
the sum is less than the pool size, but one actor 
claims more than  one-half, they agree on a division 
in which that actor gets what he or she claims and 
the rest is allocated to the other actor. These as- 
sumptions  produce  a wide range of cases in which 
a 12/12 division is predicted:  All cases in which d 
and dji  2 .205 and d1j  = dji 
For the nonunique-exchange  networks, we gen- 
eralize the dependency  concept as follows: dii  is the 
joint probability  that  "i fails to complete an allowed 
exchange" and, on that occasion,  "i fails to ex- 
change with j." The second clause recognizes the 
possibility that because multiple exchanges can be 
made with the same partner  in a round,  i may have 
b If actor  i has only one exchange  partner  j, then  the 
probability  of the joint event is simply equal to the 
probability  that  i is excluded  from  an exchange.  How- 
ever, this equality  may not hold when i has more  than 
one exchange  partner  and i can make more than one 
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exchanged with j on another  occasion. The idea is 
that i's dependency on j reflects the fact that i is 
excluded from completing some potential  exchang- 
es as a result of the failure  to complete as many ex- 
changes with  j as the connection allows. For all net- 
works, we use the baseline assumption  that  all max- 
imally complete outcomes are equally likely. 
The NBranch2  network  has two maximally  com- 
plete outcomes: A exchanges twice with B and C 
has no exchange, or B exchanges once with each A 
and C. If these outcomes are equally likely, then 
dBA = dBC  = 0 because B completes all allowed ex- 
changes in both outcomes; dAB  =  .25 because A 
fails to complete one exchange given four opportu- 
nities to exchange with B; and dCB  =  .50 because C 
fails to complete one exchange given two opportu- 
nities to exchange with B. The NT2 network has 
five maximally complete outcomes. Because B and 
C always complete their  allotted  totals, their  depen- 
dency scores are 0. The A positions complete only 
40 percent  of their potential  exchanges and so have 
a dependency on B of .60, while D completes 80 
percent of its potential  exchanges and so has a de- 
pendency on C of .20. 
Exchange-Resistance  Theory 
The baseline  predictions of exchange-resistance 
theory use the concept of "resistance."  In the work 
of Heckathorn  (1980) and Willer (1981), an actor's 
resistance to an outcome is a function of the pay- 
offs from that outcome, the "best hope" outcome 
and the "conflict" outcome. Technically, the con- 
flict outcome is the outcome given by the failure  to 
reach agreement. Any outcome that yields payoffs 
for both actors that are just as good or better than 
the conflict outcome is in the "contract  zone." An 
actor's  best hope is the outcome  in the contract  zone 
that yields maximum payoff. In the experimental 
task of dividing a pool of M profit points, we as- 
sume (as do all other  theories)  that  utility is a linear 
function of points (see Fararo  and Skvoretz 1993). 
Therefore,  the best hope of both i and  j is M points, 
the conflict payoff is 0 points, and the resistances 
of i and  j to a division in which i receives xi points 
and  j receives M-xi points are: 
R  M-xi  and  R.  M- (M-X)  (A-3) 
M-0  M-0 
Agreement is predicted  to occur on the outcome to 
which  i  and j  are equally resistant. This is  the 
"equiresistance principle." In the absence of any 
further  considerations,  this outcome is an equal di- 
vision of the pool. 
To coordinate  with previous research,  we incor- 
porate an additional consideration into the resis- 
tance equation and assume that the numerator  is a 
function of the probability  that an actor  is included 
in an exchange. In particular,  we assume a power 
function  in which the difference between the maxi- 
mum payoff and what the actor  would receive from 
an offer is raised to the power determined by the 
probability of being included. Thus, the baseline 
model for exchange-resistance  theory assumes that 
the resistances  of i and  j are given by: 
Ri =  (M  -Xi  )" 
M 
and 
[M - (M - xi)]  (A-4) 
where  pi and  p1  are  the probabilities  of being includ- 
ed for i and  j. Equating  the resistances and simpli- 
fying yields an equation that can be solved for x 
and which provides the baseline predictions  in Ta- 
ble 2: 
ln(M-xi)  -  pj  (A-5) 
ln(xk)  Pi 
The probabilities  of being included depend on the 
pattern  of exchange-seeking. This pattern,  in turn, 
is determined  by the relative GPI scores following 
either Markovsky et al.'s (1988) Axiom 2 that "i 
seeks exchange with j if and only if i's  power is 
greater  than  j'  s or if i' s power relative  to j equals or 
exceeds that in any of i's other relations"  (p. 225) 
or the weak power random-seek  extension in Mark- 
ovsky et al. (1993). For example, according to this 
analysis, A's probability  of being included  in Stem, 
a weak power network,  is .60 while B's probability 
is 1.00. Therefore,  the points that B should earn in 
exchanges  with A is  that value of x  for which 
ln(24 -x)  = .6x, which is 18.3. Extending  this meth- 
od to the nonunique-exchange  networks  is a simple 
matter  because an actor cannot simultaneously  ne- 
gotiate multiple  deals with another  actor even if he 
or she can make more than one exchange per round 
with that alter. The only new element is that con- 
cluding a deal with such an alter may not eliminate 
that alter  from the space of potential  partners. 
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